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Reflexions
Demography in a new key:




The widespread opinion that demography is lacking in theory is based in part on a
particular view of the nature of scientific theory, generally known as logical empiricism
[or positivism].  A newer school of philosophy of science, the model-based view,
provides a different perspective on demography, one that enhances its status as a
scientific discipline. From this perspective, much of formal demography can be seen as
a collection of substantive models of population dynamics [how populations and
cohorts behave], in short, theoretical knowledge.    And many theories in behavioural
demography – often discarded as too old or too simplistic – can be seen as perfectly
good scientific theory, useful for many purposes, although often in need of more
rigorous statement.
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1. Introduction
The status of theory in demography has been problematic for as long as I can
remember.  It has been over fifty years since Rupert Vance asked ‘Is theory for
demographers?’ (1952). There is ample evidence that not a few demographers – then
and now -- would answer ‘Of course, but it’s not a high priority.’   But if demography is
a true science – as opposed to a body of techniques or a branch of applied statistics
(Note 1) – it must have theory, recognise that it has theory, codify its theory, and
seriously teach theory to its students.
In his Presidential Address to the Population Association of America, Nathan
Keyfitz (1971) adopted what he termed a ‘liberal view of models.’  In this paper, I
would like to sketch a ‘liberal’ view of scientific theory, and to discuss some of its
implications for the way we think about demography and the way we present it to
others.
This view of theory is known in philosophy of science circles as the ‘semantic’
view, or more recently and descriptively, the ‘model-based’ view of science.  In
describing this approach, I shall draw heavily on the work of Ronald Giere, an
American philosopher of science (1988, 1999), but also on some methodological
writings of our own Nathan Keyfitz (1971, 1975). Keyfitz introduced many of these
ideas to demography over 30 years ago, although they never became mainstream (Note
2).
In the model-based view models, not empirical laws, are the central element of
scientific knowledge.  A model is any abstract representation of some portion of the real
world. A model may contain basic principles generally regarded as ‘laws.’  In this case,
the laws ‘function as true statements, but not as statements about the world.  They are
then truths only of an abstract model.  In this context, such statements are true in the
way that explicit definitions are true’ (Giere, 1999, p.6).  A model contains
generalisations, but they are formal generalisations, not empirical ones.    Empirical
assessment of theory, therefore, relates not to whether a theoretical model is empirically
true or false – strictly speaking all theories and models are false because they are
incomplete and simplified representations of reality -- but ‘how well the resulting model
fits the intended aspects of the real world’ (Giere, 1999, p.6).  This view stands opposed
to many of the familiar teachings of logical empiricism, by which theory is based on
empirical laws, and judged true or false by its agreement with data.  The model-based
view is equally concerned with empirical data, but these are used to judge whether a
model fits some portion of the world closely enough for a given purpose, not whether
the model is true or false in any absolute sense.  Two general implications of the model-
based approach for our view of demography:Demographic Research – Volume 9, Article 11
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a) Much of formal demography (techniques, methods) can be viewed also as
theory, that is, as a collection of substantive models about how populations and cohorts
behave;
b) Many ideas from behavioural demography that have been rejected as
empirically false or too simplistic can be viewed as perfectly good theory,  especially if
they were to be stated more rigorously.
Indeed, at the theoretical level, the classic distinction between formal and
behavioural demography loses much of its force.  In both sub-areas of demography,
theoretical models have essentially the same epistemological standing, even if they may
differ on other dimensions such as scope and complexity, and even if different kinds of
day-to-day work may be involved in their development and use.
I recognise that the word theory is ambiguous in the non-pejorative sense of
‘having two or more meanings.’  It means different things to different people, both in
everyday speech and in scientific discourse.  In such circumstances, it is futile to try to
establish the ‘correct’ definition or the ‘true meaning’ of theory.  But it is possible and
useful to suggest a new – though certainly not entirely new -- approach to theory that
might prove more fruitful than the older ideas to which many of us are accustomed.  In
the next section, I summarise the main elements of the model-based view, noting some
ways in which it differs from, but also agrees with, logical empiricism.  A key part of
this exposition is a partial re-definition of such terms as model  and  theory. But
terminology is not crucial, and some may want to define these words differently, and to
preserve a sharp distinction between theory and  model. The central ideas I wish to
convey are an emphasis on formal demography as substantive knowledge, and a plea
that empirical exceptions to otherwise useful behavioural theories should not lead to
their discard.
In the logical empiricist view of science, theory comes from data through a process
of induction and generalisation.  Theoretical knowledge and empirical knowledge are
seen as occupying different but parallel planes, layered upward into ever more general
and abstract propositions.  In the model-based view, theory and empirical studies are
seen as occupying non-parallel planes.  The planes must intersect, of course, since we
are discussing empirical science.  But the origin and character of the two kinds of
knowledge are qualitatively different.Demographic Research – Volume 9, Article 11
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2. A model-based view of science
In the model-based view of science, as the name suggests, models, not laws, are the
central element.  The prototype of scientific knowledge is not the empirical or
theoretical law, but a model plus a list of real-world systems to which it applies.
In this picture of science, the primary representational relationship is
between individual models and particular real systems, e.g., between a
Newtonian model of a two-body gravitational system and the Earth-Moon
system….  Here we have not a universal law, but the restricted
generalization that various pairs of objects in the solar system may be
represented by a Newtonian two-body gravitational model of a specified
type (Giere, 1999, p.93).
A model is any abstract representation of some portion of the real world,
constructed for the purpose of understanding, explanation, prediction, or control. Giere
distinguishes three types of models:
1) physical models (for example, an automobile in a wind tunnel, or a physical
model of the hydrogen atom);
2) visual models (for example, maps showing plate tectonics, or a diagram of the
demographic transition);
3) theoretical models (for example, Newton’s ‘law’ of falling bodies, or the theory
of evolution).
Physical models have little relevance to demography and other social sciences.
Visual models have great potential, but are not as widely used as they might be, with
the bulk of graphics in demography limited to the representation of data frequency
distributions, time series, and age-structures rather than processes or systems.
Theoretical models can be expressed in ordinary language, formal logical systems,
mathematics, or computer code (Note 3).
In the model-based view, no sharp distinction is made between models and theory.
A collection of small models relating to a particular realm can be called theory (for
example, the theory of harmonic oscillators, or the theory of population aging).  These
models typically are small in the sense that they contain a small number of variables,
and are constructed to represent very limited portions of the real world. Or, theory can
refer to a system of very general ideas (for example, the theory of relativity, or
transition theory) attempting to represent larger, more complex real world systems.  The
difference is not qualitative, but relates to differences in scope, complexity, and otherDemographic Research – Volume 9, Article 11
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quantitative dimensions (Note 4).  There may be advantages to preserving fine
distinctions among the words theory, model, and theoretical model in some contexts.  In
this paper, they can be used more or less interchangeably.
Giere draws a useful analogy between scientific models and maps, viewed as
simplified representations of our physical surroundings [1999, pp.25-26; 81-82; 214-
215].  Like theoretical models, maps typically vary in scope.  We have maps giving a
broad overview of nations or of whole states or provinces, and more detailed maps,
often as insets, of smaller areas such as cities or metropolitan areas.  Some maps are
extremely simple.  An example is the straight-line map found on metro trains or
subways, which show only the stops and transfer points for a particular line, which is all
the rider needs to know.  Maps differ in scope and detail, but all are abstract
representations of reality.
A theory or theoretical model is a formal system: a set of propositions involving
objects, variables, and relations among them.  It must be clear and logically consistent.
A model is constructed in an attempt to represent or explain some empirical reality.  But
it need not be derived from empirical generalisations.  And it does not have to be –
indeed it cannot be – empirically true.    In Giere’s words, models are true ‘in the way
explicit definitions are true’ (1999, p.6).  They can never be absolutely and literally true
because they are always partial and approximate representations of an infinitely
complex real world.  Scientific theories, he notes elsewhere (1988, p.xvi) can be viewed
‘not as empirical statements but as definitions of models variously related to the real
world.’  And so, ‘Science does not deliver to us universal truths underlying all natural
phenomena; but it does provide models of reality possessing various degrees of scope
and accuracy’ (1999, p.6).  One can have, says Giere, realism without truth.
Keyfitz, discussing models of the demographic effects of eliminating deaths from
heart diseases, comments similarly that his conclusions ‘…are conditional statements,
and as such they are true beyond debate, given their assumptions that death rates by age
from all other causes and birth rates by age of mother will remain as they are’ (1971,
p.574).  Conclusions drawn from a model follow inexorably from assumptions and
model structure.  Later, he contrasts the firmness of these conclusions with those
established by ‘direct observation, which tend to provide enigmatic and inconsistent
reports’ (1975, p.267).
How then does one evaluate a model or theory?  A model is a good model – Giere
would not say a ‘valid’ or ‘true’ model – if it fits some portion of the real world 1)
closely enough, 2) in certain respects, 3) for a specific purpose.  All models are
approximations. The question is whether the approximation is ‘good enough.’  All
models have a limited number of variables; none can mirror the numberless qualities of
the real world.  And finally, any model is to be evaluated with reference to the purpose
for which it was designed or constructed.Demographic Research – Volume 9, Article 11
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The map analogy cited earlier helps clarify the last point.  A highway map and a
topographic map can both represent a particular area.  But the highway map is relatively
useless for back-country hiking.  It is not an incorrect or false representation, just the
wrong one for the purpose of hiking.  Similarly, a metro map correctly tells a rider
where to get on and off the train, but is practically useless when one emerges above
ground.  A map of city streets is needed.
Over time in any science, some models receive widespread and more or less
permanent acceptance because they seem to embody central principles, or because they
are widely applicable.  In physics, classical mechanics provides an example.  And these
models are taught systematically in every introductory physics course.  It is well
understood that such models do not work so well at the sub-atomic level, or on the scale
of the universe. But they are not therefore abandoned.  In fact they are widely used in
space exploration.
The ‘fit’ of a model to some part of the real world is a matter for empirical
examination.  It is this empirical research that links model and data.  But the conclusion
that a model does not fit a particular case – perhaps not even closely – is only a
conclusion that the model does not fit, not that the model is inherently false or invalid.
It may well fit other cases.  Decisions about whether or how well models fit the real
world are based on scientific judgement, not on purely logical criteria. Giere again:
‘judging the fit of a model to the world is matter of decision, not logical inference’
(1999, p.7).
The model-based view of theory has developed in conscious opposition to logical
empiricism, the dominant philosophy of empirical social science during the second half
of the 20
th century.  It differs from logical positivism in that the elements of a model do
not have to be or be derived from or be logically consistent with broad – some would
say universal – empirical generalisations or ‘laws.’  Such generalisations as exist may
be incorporated into a model, but they are not essential.  Many proponents of the
model-based approach conclude that the logical empiricist program has been self-
defeating precisely because empirical generalisations in social science are relatively
rare (Note 5).
The model-based view agrees with logical empiricism in its emphasis on the
importance of empirical observation.  It is the real world, insofar as it can be observed,
that one is trying to understand and explain, not some imaginary world, a pure
construct.  The imagination is at play in theorising and model building.  But it begins
with some empirical observation to be accounted for, and it returns to empirical
observation to see if the account is a good or useful one.  Otherwise, there is endless
speculation.
The model-based view differs from a common view of economic theory, in which
theory is derived from a limited set of axioms such as ‘impersonal markets,’Demographic Research – Volume 9, Article 11
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‘maximising behaviour,’ ‘well-ordered preferences,’ etc.  In the model-based view, the
canonical axioms of economics may be incorporated into a model, but they need not be.
In the model-based view, model construction is less constrained than in logical
empiricism or mainstream economics.  It is a creative leap from some empirical
phenomenon that needs to be understood or explained to the construction of a model
that seems to do the job.  Whether or how well it does so, as already noted, is a matter
for empirical examination and scientific judgement.
The model-based view agrees with economics in an emphasis on the need for rigor
in the statement of theories.  The empirical assessment or use of models depends on
their capacity to yield definite implications or predictions, and to support truly logical
explanations.
In the model-based view, however, theory is not deductive in the sense of being
inferred from a limited set of axioms. But explanation using a model is deductive, in the
sense that the event or outcome to be explained must follow logically from the model,
must be deducible from it. Nor is theory inductive in the sense of being derived from an
examination of many cases to arrive at broad empirical generalisations.  It is inductive
in the broader sense that it starts with empirical observation and arrives at an abstract,
and therefore general, model (Franck, 2002).  But the process involves a creative leap
of the imagination, not just generalisation of the facts.
A model or theory need not deal with general classes of phenomena.  Otherwise,
there could be no theory of the evolution of the human race or of the origins of the
universe, both unique events.  It is one of the strengths of the model-based view of
science that it directs us to use abstract models to study unique events, unlike logical
empiricism which requires empirical generalisations about classes of events.  In the
latter system, to the extent an event is truly unique, it cannot be subsumed under a class
or a class-based generalisation, and therefore cannot be explained.  The model-based
approach to unique events enables us to pursue theoretical explanations, rather than
falling back on the pure descriptions of ethnography or narrative history.
In this liberal view of theory, there are many different kinds.  There are simple
theories or theoretical models, and very complex ones.  There are theories which apply
to large categories or classes of phenomena (for example, fluid dynamics), and those
which apply to unique events (for example, the origins of the universe, or human
evolution).  Clearly the latter kind of theory cannot be based on empirical
generalisations based on the study of many cases; there is only one case.  The generality
lies in the model itself, not in data. In Meehan’s words, ‘…timeless or general
propositions are assumed to belong to the logical rather than the empirical world’
(1968, p.32).
In order to apply to a particular phenomenon, of course, a theoretical model must
be given greater specification.  But even with such specification, it remains a theoreticalDemographic Research – Volume 9, Article 11
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model.  The term theoretical model, for Giere, refers ‘either to a general model or to
one of its specific versions obtained by specifying unique values for all parameters and
initial conditions’ (1999, p.177).
In physics, a distinction is sometimes made between phenomenological  and
fundamental  theories (see Cartwright, 1983). The former is essentially a description of
what happens and how, without too much concern for why.  A classic example is
Newton’s principle of gravity, which tells us that bodies released from a height will fall,
and approximately how fast they will accelerate, but does not tell us what gravity is
(Ekeland, 1988).  Fundamental theory delves more deeply into causes and mechanisms.
Meehan (1968) makes a similar distinction between models which can only predict
that something will happen, and those that can also explain why it will happen, by
explicating processes or mechanisms.  He views the latter as more difficult to construct,
but also as more powerful, insofar as they make it possible to control events – at least in
principle – not just adjust to them.
Other things equal, fundamental or explanatory models are of greater scientific
value, because they involve deeper knowledge and understanding, and have more
varied applications.  But model assessment is related to purpose.  And for some
purposes, a phenomenological model may be just as effective and, often as not, easier to
use.
3. Some demographic models revisited
The model-based approach to science leads to a new perspective on demography;
demographic knowledge, old and new, is seen from a different angle.  Or, to use a
musical metaphor, the same old demographic songs can be sung in a new key and re-
harmonised. This approach, I believe, greatly enhances demography’s status as a
science, notably its status as an autonomous discipline with its own large body of good
theory.
A few examples will illustrate the point.
The exponential growth model: No one would question the meaning or validity or
‘truth’ of the expression P(t) = P(0) e
rt..  It is a function that is defined, and is true by
definition.  In demography, the empirical question cannot be whether it is true, but only
whether it fits a particular case at hand.  And this depends on purpose. It is a good
theoretical model to describe the basic character of the growth of the human and many
other biological species, namely, that it tends to be proportional to population size.  It is
a good model to calculate an annual average rate of growth over some historical period,Demographic Research – Volume 9, Article 11
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although like many averages the resulting figure may be misleading.  The exponential
model, however, does not work at all well to describe the actual growth trajectory of
many, perhaps most, real-world populations – consider the many examples of supra-
exponential growth during the last three centuries. But we do not therefore say that the
exponential model has been ‘falsified,’ only that it doesn’t fit the case.
Is the exponential model demographic theory?  Perhaps one would prefer to call it
a theoretical model or just a model.  But when it is taken together with several others –
the logistic, a supra-exponential model, the stable model, the projection model (see
below), one can legitimately speak of the resulting collection as a ‘theory of population
growth.’
The life table: The life table usually is presented as a complex measurement
device, primarily a measure of ‘current’ mortality.  But more fundamentally, it can be
viewed as a theoretical model of cohort survival.  The algorithm for calculating a life
table from assumed death rates or probabilities is ‘true,’ depending as it does on the
straightforward application of basic arithmetical operations.  And, a life-table based on
observed rates is a true summary of those rates. Again, the relevant question is not
whether a particular life table is true or false, but whether it fits some real-world
situation closely enough for the purpose at hand.  To summarise current age-specific
death rates and re-work the information they contain into a more useful form (for
example, for calculating survival ratios), the life table works quite well.  Whether the
input rates somehow misrepresent some true, underlying mortality level is another
issue, as is the question of whether a current life table can be used to forecast future
mortality.  The very best life table for contemporary humans would do a poor job of
characterising the survival patterns of early humanoids or of other species, say insects
(Note 6).  But we can only say that it does not apply in these cases, not that it is invalid
or false.  Incidentally, I would describe the life table and other objects from ‘formal’
demography as being behavioural, in the sense they characterise the survival behaviour
of a cohort – aggregate behaviour to be sure, but behaviour nonetheless.
The Coale-McNeil marriage model: The Coale-McNeil model of first marriage
(Coale and McNeil, 1972; Coale, 1977) began life as an exercise in mathematical curve
fitting.  Only later was it interpreted in terms of waiting times for entry into various
stages of the marriage process.  I once criticised the model in comparison with that of
Hernes (see Burch, 1993) because it was lacking in behavioural theory; I characterised
the waiting-times interpretation as ‘semi-behavioural.’  This earlier assessment reflected
my logical empiricist training and heritage, and my acceptance of the conventional
sharp distinction between formal and behavioural demography. I would now say that to
find a parametric model that closely fits a large collection of age patterns of firstDemographic Research – Volume 9, Article 11
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marriage is a considerable theoretical achievement – in the category of
phenomenological theory.  It is behavioural in the sense mentioned above -- it captures
important features of cohort behaviour.  It is not, of course, the only good model of
marriage.  There are several others, some of which may be better for certain purposes.
And there is both need and opportunity to develop rigorous models of marriage that are
much more complex and more richly behavioural.  Some recent agent-based models of
marriage (Todd and Billari, 2003; Billari, Prskawetz, and Fürnkranz,  2003) represent
one promising direction for these efforts.
Coale and Trussell’s later (1995) discussion of the character of parametric models
is instructive:
The models are descriptive and were never intended to be anything else.  No
deep theory, or even shallow theory, underlies the search for empirical
regularities (p.483).
The quality of a model, in their view, ‘depends on how usefully it can be exploited
for empirical research’ (p.469).  Three uses are highlighted: testing data; building
blocks for estimates; forecasting. The value of models is closely tied to working with
‘inaccurate and incomplete data’ (p.484).
Later they lament ‘the virtual absence of the development and steep decline in the
use of demographic models during the past decade,’ related in part to increasing
availability of good survey data (p.484).  But if the value of demographic models is tied
primarily to the absence of good data, then there is some logic in a decline in their use
as data improve.  If they are viewed instead as substantive models of demographic
behaviour, then they have permanent value and application.  This is recognised
implicitly when they note that models ‘can be used to make broad inferences about
behaviour…’ But the emphasis is elsewhere, since they continue: ‘…or, more
commonly, to build techniques for estimating basic demographic indices for
populations with limited or defective data’ (p.484).
Two kinds of transition theory: One of the problems with the theory of
demographic transition is that we have never quite agreed on precisely what it is
(McNicoll, 1992). In keeping with what has gone before, I would suggest that there are
two kinds of transition theory.  The phenomenological version simply states that a
large, sustained decline in mortality will be followed after some time lag by a large,
sustained decline in fertility, resulting in an intervening period of rapid population
growth.  A more fundamental version would include the determinants of mortality and
fertility decline – modernisation, economic growth, secularisation/individualisation,
technological developments in medicine and fertility control, and so forth.Demographic Research – Volume 9, Article 11
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Either version of transition theory can be stated as an abstract model.  In the
former case, the model would assume a population in dynamic equilibrium, with
constant mortality and fertility (and no migration).  An assumed pattern of mortality
decline is followed, after a delay, by fertility decline.  There is rapid growth in the
intervening period, and slower growth when a new equilibrium is established.  Such a
model is true by construction, ‘true in the way that a definition is true.’  Empirically it
can be used to characterise the modern demographic history of many – though certainly
not all – human populations.  For others, for example France or Hungary, a different
model is needed (Note 7).
A more ‘behavioural’ version of transition theory can also be stated as an abstract
model.  Mortality decline is defined as a function of development, with subsequent
fertility decline a function both of mortality decline and of development. The approach
would be similar to population biologists’ definition of the logistic model, in which
mortality and fertility are functions of population density. The key difference is that in a
transition model, mortality declines with development and population growth, whereas
in the logistic model it rises [in both, fertility declines]. The link between mortality
decline and fertility decline might be explicated in terms of pressure at the individual,
family, or community level, as a result of larger numbers of surviving children. Again,
such a transition model would provide an approximate but accurate description of the
demographic history of many nations, along with a behavioural explanation for that
history. With closer specification and real data inputs, it could provide a better
approximation of the history of a particular nation.  Probably no one specification could
provide a close fit to the history of all nations, since this history did not occur ‘in a
vacuum,’ as it were, or in controlled experimental conditions.  It was this historical fact
that led Coale to conclude that the only generalisation to emerge from the vast historical
studies of European fertility decline was that fertility would decline when a population
was, to borrow Lesthaeghe’s paraphrase, ‘ready, willing, and able’ (Lesthaeghe and
Vanderhoeft, 1997).  The postulated mechanism linking mortality and fertility decline,
of course, does not flow from an empirical generalisation, which is precisely why it is a
theoretical explanation.
It would be easy to multiply examples, drawn from the demographic literature both
old and new.  But these suffice to show that, whether in the realm of formal
demography or of behavioural demography – as traditionally conceived – we can view
our models as formal models, models that are true in the way that definitions are true.
In either sub-field, our models are abstract representations of the real world, inspired by
empirical observation; epistemologically, they are of one piece. The models of formal
demography are not just measurement techniques.  They have a theoretical character
(Note 8).  The models of behavioural demography need not be rejected because they do
not fit all the facts, so long as they fit some relevant cases well enough to be useful forDemographic Research – Volume 9, Article 11
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one or another purpose. When all is said and done, demography has much more good
theory than commonly thought.
4. Demography reconsidered
The model-based view of demography has many further implications for the way we
think of the field, and the way we present it to others, notably our students.   I highlight
five, some of them recapitulated from above.
1) We need to become more comfortable with the idea of several different models
for the same phenomenon.  Logical empiricism pushed toward the view that in
empirical tests, one model would emerge as a winner, with the others being falsified
and rejected.  I have always suspected that this idea is a reflection of a deep, even sub-
conscious, monotheistic belief in our culture.  Early scientific thinking often was
explicitly theological (note recent publicity about Newton’s theological speculations).
God created the universe, implanting in it certain laws.  Science’s job was to find them.
And since there is only one God, laws of nature will be unique.  This led to what Teller
(2001) has called ‘the perfect model model’ of science.
The model-based view prefers to think of a pantheon, or to change the metaphor, a
toolkit of related models with different characteristics and serving different purposes.
With respect to population growth, for example, one can point to: the exponential
model; the logistic model; transition theory; the stable model; the projection model – to
mention a few of the most obvious.  Which is the true model of population growth?
The question makes no sense.  With respect to fertility, similarly, one can point to:
Becker’s microeconomic model; the Easterlin-Crimmins model; Friedman, Hechter and
Kanmazawa’s uncertainty model (1994); the social capillarity model; Davis’s
multiphasic model; Coale’s model of the three preconditions; transition theory;
Lesthaeghe on secular individualism; the newer models on ‘social influence’ and
diffusion, etc.  Which is the true model of fertility?  If we retain the notion of truth at
all, then surely the most that can be said is that each model incorporates some element
of truth.  None is complete nonsense, such as the idea that fertility decline has been
imposed on us by Martians to prevent our depletion of the world’s resources before they
can get to them.
This ‘toolkit’ approach to scientific theories does not imply that all models are of
absolutely equal value.  Some models may turn out to be better approximations of a
wider variety of cases, or useful for a wider variety of purposes.  Such models will
naturally tend to be used more often.  But the lesser models also will be used on
occasion.  It is not prudent to discard them.Demographic Research – Volume 9, Article 11
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2) As noted earlier, at the theoretical level the sharp traditional distinction between
formal and behavioural demography is discarded.  All theories or theoretical models
become formal in the sense outlined above.  In Lotka’s phrase, all theory is ‘analytic
theory’ (1939).  The body of work we generally regard as demographic ‘techniques’ or
‘method’ can still be thought of as techniques.  But much of it also can be thought of as
theoretical models of population dynamics – substantive models of how populations or
cohorts behave, often under idealised conditions.  Past practice in this regard is
inconsistent.  The stable model is commonly referred to as ‘stable theory.’  But the
cohort-component projection model is classified as a ‘technique,’ and many
demographers would object to its classification as theory.  Yet both models represent
the development of population size and structure in the face of assumed inputs.  It is
hard to see why one is theory and one is not – unless one can argue for a valid
distinction based on the level of mathematics involved.
Reinterpreted models from formal demography are behavioural in a limited sense
of dealing with the behaviour of aggregates, without explicit reference to motivation,
values, norms, and decision making (see McNicoll’s (1992) reference to ‘the limitless
depths’ of human behaviour).  But they are behavioural nonetheless, in the same sense
that Newton’s law speaks to the behaviour of falling bodies.
But surely, it may be objected, the classic distinction between necessary and
contingent relationships (see Lotka’s distinction between ‘analytic’ and ‘statistical’
demography) is valid.  I reply with a distinction.  There is contingency in our empirical
observations.  But we construct theoretical models in a way that contingency is left
behind.  The statement natural increase equals births minus deaths states a necessary
relationship; the empirical statement high rates of female labour-force participation are
associated with very low fertility is contingent, and not universally true.  But the
assumption that it is true can be incorporated in a constructed model.  It is then true by
construction, true ‘in the way that a definition is true.’  This is essentially the message
of Keyfitz’s 1975 paper on ‘How do we know the facts of demography?’
In the teaching of demography, I have come to see the formal-behavioural
distinction as  arbitrary.  Consider a lecture on the determinants of population growth,
based on a series of models. Successively we show that growth depends on numbers of
births, deaths, and migrants (in and out).  We then show that numbers of births depends
on some rate or set of rates interacting with population size and age-structure.  A
student asks: ‘But what determines the rates?’  The conventional answer might be:
‘This course only deals with formal demography and techniques.  To consider that
question you have to take another course.’ (Note 9)  A model-based approach would
simply move on to the next set of theoretical models, those dealing with the
determinants of fertility, for example, Easterlin-Crimmins or Coale.  I have neverDemographic Research – Volume 9, Article 11
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encountered a physics or chemistry text that made such a sharp distinction between
formal and behavioural physics or chemistry, or between substance and method.
3) Many computer simulations in demography may be viewed as theory or as tools
for theoretical analysis.  For many social and behavioural theorists, manipulation of a
numerical model with a computer is ‘number crunching,’ not theory.  For many
empiricists, it is theory in the bad sense of armchair speculation, yielding numbers that
are made up.  The model-based view would say rather that a simulation is an abstract
model of a real demographic system, and can be manipulated to yield insight into how
that system works, or applied to real world systems to explain or predict.  There is no
inherent difference between this use of a simulation model and the classic uses of stable
population theory to clarify dynamic interrelations among fertility, mortality,
population growth, and age structure.  An interesting question is why demographers
have generally been more receptive to stable analyses than to many computer
simulations.
This view of simulation is not unknown in demography.  It has been expounded
and illustrated over the years by researchers such as Hammel and Wachter, to give but
one example.  In fact, a computer model is just another kind of model, written in a new
kind of language.  And the model-based view of science does not differ greatly from the
mainstream tradition of mathematical modelling, in which a model is constructed for a
specific purpose and its performance judged explicitly with reference to that purpose.
Mathematical modellers have generally not viewed their work as theory, however,
although in many contexts, it can be so viewed.
In his ‘liberal view of models,’ Keyfitz noted, ‘…they may be algebraic,
arithmetical, computer simulation, or verbal’ (1971, p.575).  His example of a verbal
model is ‘demographic transition’ theory.  And as his later paper (1975) strongly
suggests, there is no essential difference between a model and a theory.
4) In order to qualify as theoretical models of the kind I am urging, many if not
most of our ‘behavioural’ models will have to be stated more clearly and more
rigorously (Burch, 1996).  This is necessary if we are successfully to deduce
implications of the models. It will not do to work with highly discursive models which
‘give us a feel for what’s going on.’  Such models, as is well known, can be used to
explain or predict almost anything, and therefore explain or predict nothing.
The need to derive definite implications, incidentally, is why the ‘probabilistic
finesse’ – the reliance on probable generalisations rather than universal ones – is not
able to save the logical empiricist approach to theory.  A chain or other combination of
several probabilistic empirical statements yields implications of at best low probability
(by the multiplicative rule).  In the model-based approach, within the model itself  theDemographic Research – Volume 9, Article 11
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inferences are certain, allowing only for some stochastic elements.  Uncertainty comes
when the inferences are applied to the real world, since the fit is never perfect. But this
is a matter of scientific judgement, not just logic.  To quote Giere, ‘It is enough that the
premises confer some appropriate degree of “probability” or “rational warrant” to the
conclusion’ (1988, p.11).
5)  The model-based view is comfortable in dealing with particular cases.  In the
logical empiricist model of science, theory is based on generalisation across many cases
of a phenomenon considered as a class, e.g., national fertility transitions.  Explanation
of a particular case is achieved by ‘subsuming’ it under some general theoretical
propositions about the class.
There are at least two problems with this approach.  First, there may be no class.
Some phenomena are unique in the literal sense of the word – there is only one case.
The origin of the universe and the evolution of the human species are examples.
Secondly, even if there appears to be a class, often it will have been defined for extra-
scientific purposes (e.g., national and provincial political boundaries). Theoretical
considerations do not enter into the definition.  But in this case, there is no reason to
assume that the classes are homogeneous with respect to characteristics of interest.  To
try to find a general model of such a class may involve trying to represent systems that
differ in ways that are centrally important.
The model-based view of science, by contrast, has no problem with constructing
models to deal with unique events.  It offers an alternative to giving up on theory in the
face of the tremendous variability of real-world phenomena, which seems – perhaps
rightly – to defy generalisation.  To some, especially historians and anthropologists, this
variability means that one can only resort to detailed or ‘thick’ description of particular
cases.  But as has been seen above, we can have theory without generalisation.  And in
some cases (for example, the modern demographic history of Italy), we may be well
advised to do so.
5. Conclusion
But what difference does it make?  Why should we take the trouble to change our way
of looking at our discipline, and the way we present it to students, policy makers, and
the general public.  Why bother to revamp our textbooks and our courses, as might be
necessary were the model-based view to be taken seriously?
My first answer is that the model-based view should be taken seriously because it
makes more sense than the views to which we are accustomed.  It accords with an
emerging mainstream in philosophy of science, and with what scientists in some of theDemographic Research – Volume 9, Article 11
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most successful fields think about their work and teach their students.  Without
inconsistency I cannot argue that this is the true approach to science, only that it is a
liberating and fruitful one.
A second answer is that this liberal view of theory and of models enhances the
stature of demography as a science, an autonomous, well-balanced scientific discipline,
with a large body of good theory, as well as of techniques, data, and empirical findings.
Thirdly, other than some mental effort, there is little downside risk in doing
demography in a new key.  There need be no wholesale abandonment of what we
currently think and do.  We can still think of the life table as a measurement tool, while
beginning to think of it also as a theoretical model of cohort survival.  We still will
spend a great deal of time and effort on the statistical analysis of census and survey
data, and on descriptive studies of demographic trends, using census and vital statistics
data.  Techniques will be refined, and descriptive studies will continue apace, both
detailed descriptions of individual cases and attempts to generalise across cases where
that is possible.
Collectively, more time and effort will be spent on the construction of new models
and on the rigorous statement and systematisation of those we already have (theoretical
synthesis). Not everyone is likely to become a theorist or model builder.  But, one
hopes, empirical research will be better informed by explicitly and rigorously crafted
models, used to design the research, not just heuristically in the introductory sections of
papers, or for ad hoc interpretation in the concluding sections.
The danger of an uncontrolled profusion of models seems unlikely in a discipline
so closely wedded to empirical data.  But the model-based approach itself guards
against this danger, with its great emphasis on purpose: every model is built for some
clear purpose, and is judged accordingly.  One doesn’t model for the sake of modelling.
If a model doesn’t yield insights into basic principles or fit some important empirical
case – some of the data – then it will be abandoned.
What is at issue is a balance between empirical observation and theory, in a
complete science.  Demography has been exceptionally strong at empirical observation,
and has one of the largest bodies of reliable data of any of the human sciences.  But
what does it mean?  How can it be organised and presented to others?  That is the role
of theory and theoretical models.
Nancy Cartwright writes of theory: ‘Explanations (at least the high level
explanations of theoretical science…) organize, briefly and efficiently, the unwieldy,
and perhaps unlearnable, mass of highly detailed knowledge that we have of
phenomena’ (1983, p.87).  A large dose of the right kind of theoretical thinking could
help us all digest the vast body of demographic information.  Teller (2001) speaks of
‘humanly accessible understanding.’Demographic Research – Volume 9, Article 11
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Cartwright continues in the above quote: ‘But organizing power has nothing to do
with the truth.’  Bedrock truth lies in our facts (The largest national population in the
world is that of China), and in our empirical generalisations such as they are (Low
fertility tends to be associated with high levels of socio-economic development).
With a better appreciation of demography’s large fund of theoretical models, we
can have the best of both worlds: truth in our empirical observations, and, in Giere’s
words, ‘realism without truth’ in our models.  But models don’t have to be true to be
useful.  Sufficient realism to the purpose at hand supports understanding, explanation,
prediction, and policy guidance.  And, to give Keyfitz the last word – ‘no models, no
undestanding’ (1975, p.275).
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Notes
1.   See the cover of current issues of Demography (vols.39 & 40), which defines
demography as ‘the statistical study of human populations.’
2.   I also have benefited greatly from the following: Meehan (1968); Newton (1997);
Cartwright (1983; 1999).  For a current summary and assessment of the semantic
school, see Teller (2001).
3.   The idea that theory consists of purely verbal statements seems peculiar to social
science.  Physical scientists tend to think of their mathematical models as theory.
See, for example, Baylis [1994].  His book on Theoretical Methods in the Physical
Sciences is an introduction to the use of a computer mathematics program, Maple
V, to solve problems in elementary physics.
4.   Some authors distinguish theory  and  model, assigning the latter a role as
intermediary between theory and empirical data. See for example, Gould and
Tobochnik (1996); Skvoretz (1998).  Their distinction is on a general/specific axis
and is not fundamental.
5.   Critics of social science often take this rarity of universal generalisations as
evidence that the social sciences are not really science.  See, for example, The
Economist (8 May, 1999, p.84): ‘…unlike physics, economics yields no natural
laws or universal constants.  That is what makes decisive falsification in economics
so difficult.  And that is why…economics is not and never can be a proper science.’
6.   The consideration of survival curves for other species or of unrealistic curves for
humans (e.g., calculating a life table with a typical age pattern of q’s reversed)
helps put human survival in better perspective.  See Carey (2002).
7.   The literature contains a few examples of formalisation of transition theory (see,
for example, Keyfitz, 1985, pp.23ff).  But none has become standard or widely
used or cited.
8.   The idea that some demographic measurement techniques are models is not novel.
Newell (1988) for example has a chapter entitled ‘Introduction to Demographic
Models.’  He distinguishes normative and descriptive models, and mentions the
total fertility rate and the life table as examples of the former. He comments:
‘These normative models so dominate formal demography that it is not often they
are actually thought of as models; yet it should always be remembered that a move
from ASFR’s to a TFR, or from ASDR’s to a life table, is a move from reality to a
model’ [p.118].  Newell does not take the further step, advocated here, of viewing
such a model or a collection of related models as theory.Demographic Research – Volume 9, Article 11
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9.   The other side of this distinction is seen in the common practice in textbooks on
‘population problems’ of relegating most ‘technical’ demography to appendices.Demographic Research – Volume 9, Article 11
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